Says Fabric of Iraqi Society Being Torn Apart Mukhtar Limani, the Moroccan diplomat who headed the Arab League’s mission in Baghdad submitted his resignation last week. Limani’s decision, and the letter of his resignation, created a stir in the Arab world. Limani, a well-liked figure in Baghdad and among many Iraqi circles said that his decision was due to his “frustration” and his belief that very little is being done to alleviate the crisis in Iraq. Limani’s letter conveyed a sense of deep alarm regarding the developments in Iraq, which threaten to “tear apart the very fabric of Iraqi society.” Passages from Limani’s letter of resignation were leaked, but some websites published the entire text, we present, below, long excerpts from Limani’s letter of resignation. Following his resignation from his post as the head of the Arab League’s mission in Baghdad, the Pan-Arab daily, Al-Sharq al-Awsat, published an interview with Mukhtar Limani. Limani exposed much inside information concerning the Iraqi situation. He criticized many of the American actions in Iraq, including the disbanding of the Iraqi Army and the ‘de-Ba`thification’ policies. Limani also said that the ISG report “ultimately serves American interests alone,” and asserted that the infighting in Iraq has surpassed killings between sects and is now exhibiting itself as intercinine conflict within sects. Limani was one on the few diplomats, and the only Arab ambassador in Baghdad (most Arab embassies are currently operating from Amman, Jordan). Furthermore, Limani established the Arab League’s mission in the heart of Baghdad and outside of the Green Zone, as Limani says, the mission was in the ‘red zone’ (he defined the ‘red zone’ as the entirety of Iraqi except for the Green Zone). Limani also said that the Arab League mission was protected by Kurdish Peshmerga forces, which he found ironic, “An Arab mission protected by the Kurds.” Below are excerpts from Limani’s interview: Q: how was the situation as you left Iraq? A: Tragic, I have never seen a crisis in the world that has gotten as complicated as Iraq’s...there is a situation of complete distrust between Iraqis...I noticed that, especially among politicians, one’s commitment towards his sect of ethnicity is stronger than his attachment to his ‘Iraqness’. Q: Can Iraqis today fortify their country through an internal reconciliation? A: They cannot right now, because they are in a state of tension and reactions...I believe I was among the few in Iraq, perhaps the only one, who had a relationship with all Iraqi sides, from the resistance to the government to the Association of Muslim Scholars. Q: Is there a real resistance in Iraq? A: Yes, there is, definitely Q: Is it an Islamic or nationalist resistance? A: There is everything, there are varied and numerous organizations, weapons are abundant, sometimes you find a group of ten individuals, and some are made up of dozens or hundreds. I will not name names, but many organized groups came in as a result of the grave mistakes that ... Bremer has committed. When he disbanded the army and started ‘de-Ba`thification,’ these groups had no option but to resist... Q: Is the resistance using Saddam’s weapons? A: I have no accurate information, but the easiest thing to get in Iraq is weapons. Q: In what sense should the US revise its strategy? A: I met (James) Baker, and we spoke at length. What worries me is that the Iraqi dossier... is being evaluated according to America’s interests, and not Iraq’s...from my observation...the problem will not be solved by adding American troops to Iraq. Adding 21,000 extra soldiers will bring the total to 150, 000 soldiers, which will change nothing. Coalition forces in 2005 were 160, 000 and the situation was worse. America carries a heavy responsibility (for the current situation)... Q: What about the regional players, the Arabs and Iran, how do you assess their positions? A: It is shameful that the Arabs are irresponsibly watching the unfolding of events, as if what is happening does not concern them. It is not in their interest. Iran should also review its positions, because it has been using the current state of fragmentation in Iraq to infiltrate the country...it is also not in its interest... many people and tribes from the Southern area expressed to me their discontent over the Iranian infiltration and its form...I believe that Iraq’s collapse will scorch the entire area. Q: Do you see hope in the current moment? Or is the situation bleak and hopeless? A: There is a failed political project...reconciliation did not succeed, nothing succeeded...some regional players entrenched themselves, others are infiltrating Iraq, and others content to sit idly and watch as if they will be spared the effects of what is happening in Iraq...the security situation is disastrous... the living conditions are disastrous, people are without electricity or water, the core of Iraqi society is being disshelved. Iraqis are leaving the country at the rate of 3,000 families per day... Q: Do you agree that there is a problem as to who we should be talking to in Iraq? Whether within the government or the other groups? Perhaps there are Iraqi groups that are blocking negotiations? A: This is a real problem because of the numerous groups and interests and agendas. There exist 400 to 500 registered political parties in Iraq, 99% of them have no more than three members. Limani's Letter: Your Excellency, Secretary General Warm Regards, Firstly, history has taught us that the land of Iraq is the cradle of civilizations. The inhabitants of this land have throughout their history –which is measured by the entirety of human history- been able to use their rich and beautiful mosaic to make Iraq a beacon of knowledge and a land of civilizational, religious and cultural influence. History has also taught us that the people of Iraq have faced, throughout their long history, numerous tribulations and tragedies, some of which were harsher than their current crisis, but they were able to surmount them... But their current trial represents a unique form of danger in that there are attempts to tear apart that beautiful mosaic. There are numerous variables involved: internal, regional and international, and each of these elements has its own complexities which drastically increase with the interaction between all these variables. 1- Internal: The people of Iraq have no agreement today over a unified diagnosis for their malaise, and, subsequently over the commitments that need to be fulfilled in order to achieve a qualitative improvement in the state of their relationship. The current character of this relationship (between Iraqis) is one of complete mistrust, and a continuous ‘flight forward’ towards reactions and entrenchments that are nihilistic and primitive in their violence, and that contradict the rich cultural traditions of the country. The people of Iraq are currently in a situation that seeks to fragment the core of their social solidarity, despite the deep historical roots of their social fabric. The sects of Iraq, like sects everywhere whether they be religious or ethnic, contain fanatical elements on the margins, but the fanatics in Iraq have moved from the periphery to the center, placing their sects in a dynamic of actions and reactions, and a blind generalization that alters the landscape and displaces populations and kills people because of their identity. Due to that, the relationship between Iraqis has become characterized with the denial of their Iraqness...(the people of Iraq) are not convinced yet that the only way forward lies in their agreement to save their country, an agreement from which emerges a single victor: Iraq. 2- External: ... What increases the complexity of the Iraqi situation is that many of the (regional and international) conflicts are being fought in Iraq. And the trend that I have been seeing is an increased usage of Iraq as a battlefield by several actors: states, organizations and movements. I believe that the people of Iraq would be making a fatal mistake if they persisted in their attempts to fortify Iraq through external alliances, the only solution and the only guarantor to link the past of Iraq with its future is by fortifying it through the unity of its people around a national project that guarantees to everyone equal rights of citizenship, and this can be achieved through a state of institutions. In fact, such a move could bring back the influential and progressive historical role that Iraq played, as a model country. Secondly, I have come to Iraq a year ago as a result of an Arab decision to participate in the realization of Iraqi conciliation ... during my mission, I found an Iraqi people that is deeply threatened, starving and insecure. The looks in the eyes of Iraq’s children belied deep incomprehension for what was happening, and why. In short, what I have witnessed during this sad year ... does not compare to anything that I had seen during my 27-year-tenure as an international officer who has lived in several crisis spots around the world...During this year, I also saw that the tribulations of the Iraqi people did not affect its dignity, generosity and nobleness... If this people could stand again, it will not be in need for aid from anybody, due to what this country has been endowed, not only in material riches (oil and water), but also in civilization and spiritual wealth. What I fear is that (Iraq) will not forget how others dealt with it during its tragedy... Thirdly: ... I can safely say that I have no problem with any Iraqi side; my only problem is how they deal with each other, and their deeply-held feeling that every side is the victim of the other. Which may be the only common feeling among Iraqis in this critical stage. Fourth: the Arabs took a decision in their last summit in Khartoum ... to open a mission for the Arab league in Baghdad... I do not hide the fact that I had no illusions about the Arab decision, as we are used –in the Arab diplomatic tradition- to quick resolutions and no execution. My impetus for accepting the assignment was the challenge, and my intense determination to help Iraqis, no matter how miniscule my contribution would be. I accepted the assignment, and I never dealt with it as a diplomat, I simply considered Iraqis to be my people... I came to Baghdad during a period when the UN considered Baghdad to be the most dangerous part of the world...I came despite the fact that the countries that sent me did not provide any financial or security support...and the term ‘mission’ is an exaggeration here, since it only consisted of two individuals. Fifth: in the total absence of a consistent and solid Arab vision for dealing with the (Iraqi) dossier, and in the absence of the mere awareness of the importance of such a vision...and due to my belief that ‘confidence’ and ‘credibility’ alone did not and will not suffice to help the people of Iraq, which has elicited in me a deep feeling of frustration vis-à-vis the suffering that I had to witness for the entire year I was present in Iraq...the Iraqi people...does not need conferences that produce polite statements ...which have no effect on the reality of the Iraqi citizen, a reality that grows increasingly bad and frightening... I find myself compelled to inform your Excellency that I have decided to withdraw from the mission... Mukhtar Limani Head of the Permanent Mission of the Arab League Baghdad
Interesting article I read through the whole thing. There were a few points I disagreed with as is usual with any article but pretty balanced and insightful. Not that you were awaiting my approval I'm sure but most of your articles turn me off after the first paragraph.
